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‘Thou shall not…(dis)trust’: Codes of Conduct and Harmonization of 
Professional Standards in the EU 
PANAGIOTIS DELIMATSIS

A. Introductory Remarks  
The European Commission’s Proposal for a Services Directive (hereinafter ‘the 
Proposal’)
1 recognized the importance of the concept of trust in the achievement and 
the smooth functioning of a genuine internal market for services. The lack of trust 
reveals the absence of a ‘thinking European’ mentality
2 and is translated into 
protectionist pressures that aim to foreclose foreign competition. The difference 
between trust and protectionism is fairly nuanced. Distrust can lead to protectionist 
pressures in that the latter can be the result of the concern that foreign (intra- or 
extra-EU) suppliers deliver their services more efficiently or that foreign suppliers 
are not equally good as the domestic ones. Regardless of whether we follow the first, 
rather self-interest approach or the second, more benevolent, public-interest 
approach, the result is the same: Domestic markets impose unduly burdensome 
restrictions and foreign professionals’ mobility within the Union is curtailed. 
Furthermore, the lack of trust negates the possibility of comparison and thus 
obliterates any motivation for domestic service suppliers to improve.
3
Hence, services and service suppliers from other Member States (MS) are viewed 
with suspicion and considered as menacing the allegedly ‘exceptional’ quality of the 
domestic service industry.
4 Of course, the very abolition of the country of origin 
principle acrimoniously demonstrates the absence of mutual trust in the current stage 
of European integration and how long and winding the road may be until mutual trust 
among the MS is actually established. Building trust is a macro-process deeply 
rooted into the history of European integration and a continuous challenge for such a 
diverse region in terms of economic strength, regulatory approaches, or 
constitutional and cultural background. In the end, it forms integral part of the telos
of the European adventure. 
In the absence of the country of origin principle and thus quasi-automatic mutual 
recognition, the creation of codes of conduct (CoC) at a European level as an 
 Assistant Professor of Law, Tilburg University, The Netherlands. Contact: p.delimatsis@uvt.nl.
1 European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
Services in the Internal Market’, COM(2004) 2, 13 January 2004. 
2 European Commission, ‘The State of the Internal Market for Services’, COM(2002) 441 final, 30 
July 2002, p. 45. 
3 For the positive effects of mutual trust, see the seminal work by F. Fukuyama, Trust: The Social 
Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (Free Press, 1995). 
4 This suspicion takes typically the form of systematic application of the host-country rules rules, the 
simple evocation of "general good" objectives to justify obstacles, without verifying the equivalence 
of the protection in the country of origin or the proportionality of the restriction, the subjection of EU 
operators to the same system as that applied to third-country undertakings, the presumption of 
circumvention of national rules by any cross-border service, or a particular zeal in regularly checking 
suppliers from other Member States. Ibid., pp. 53-54. Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1431398
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alternative, soft method of rule-making acquires new dynamics. The Proposal, and 
the ensuing Services Directive,
5 identifies various instruments that can be used to 
reinforce trust in the quality of the legal regimes and qualification or licensing 
requirements of the other MS in its paragraph 5. One of these instruments is the 
creation of pan-European CoC dealing notably with issues such as commercial 
communications or rules of professional ethos.
6 CoC, while voluntary, soft-law 
instruments, are considered as partaking in the effort to increase the ‘awareness of 
Europeanness’,
7 pursue legitimate objectives that are accepted as valid at Community 
level and ultimately guarantee a high level of quality commensurate with the ever-
increasing expectations of the EU citizens with a view to enhancing trust among MS 
as to the equivalence of services and service suppliers originating in other MS.  
This paper aims to explore the impact of CoC on the liberalization of professional 
services using as a starting point the Services Directive and the ever-lasting attempt 
to harmonize professional standards at EU level. Effective market access for service 
suppliers can depend heavily on such codes, which are typically adopted by non-state 
bodies when they exercise their legal autonomy, e.g. professional associations, sports 
federations etc. While such (mostly voluntary) rules of conduct are aimed to improve 
the quality of the services supplied by the professionals subject to such rules, they 
can nevertheless hinder the intra-EU movement of professionals. Hence, 
liberalization of factor mobility enshrined in primary and secondary EC law or 
agreed on during state-to-state negotiations at a multilateral level can be jeopardized 
by the adoption and application of such codes. 
B. Setting the Scene: The Services Directive  
In 2002, the Commission in its report on ‘The State of the Internal Market for 
Services’,
8 which formed part of the internal market strategy for services adopted by 
the Commission in December 2000,
9 was adamantly describing the dramatic 
situation as to the never-ending  tale of completing the internal market for services. 
Complex legal barriers have been substituted for physical and technical barriers, 
thereby diminishing the possibilities for a genuine, integrated internal market for 
services. The fragmentation of the regulation of the supply of services within the 
European Union is worrisome, as it negatively affects the competitiveness of 
European firms and undermines the ambitious objective of the Union becoming the 
most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy worldwide (‘Lisbon 
Strategy’). And yet services account for two-thirds of total employment and for all 
new employment growth within the Union,
10 while other studies praise the growth-
5 Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on 
Services in the Internal Market 2006 OJ L 376/36. The directive is to be implemented by December 
2009 at the latest. For a detailed account of the Directive, see C. Barnard, ‘Unravelling the Services 
Directive’ (2008) 45 Common Market Law Review, 323-394. 
6 The other instruments are: (minimum or targeted) harmonization; administrative co-operation and 
mutual assistance between national authorities; and (voluntary) measures promoting the quality of 
services. See also the 7
th recital of the Services Directive. 
7 Supra note 2. 
8 European Commission, supra note 2. 
9 European Commission, ‘Internal Market Strategy – Priorities 2003-2006’, COM(2003) 238, 7 May 
2003. This strategy came as a response to the request by the Lisbon European Council in March 2000. 
See the Presidency Conclusions of the Lisbon European Council, para. 17. 
10 European Commission, ‘New European Labour Markets, Open to All, with Access for All’, - 3 - 
generating effects and positive spillovers of services liberalization.
11
The EU as a block is the leading player in international trade in services with a 
surplus of €68.5 billion in 2006, representing a world share in trade in services of 
around 25%.
12 In business services, which incorporate professional services, the EU-
27 has achieved a surplus of €31 billion in 2006, one of the highest scores that year. 
Outsourcing, of course, is one of the main reasons explaining the sector’s rapid 
growth. Intra-EU 27 trade in services, on the other hand, amounts to 57% of total 
exports of services
13 and accounts for one-quarter of the global trade in services.
14
Services exert an essential role in the overall functioning of markets, since they 
underlie the relations between producers and consumers. Services are an 
indispensable component of the information industry networks on which these 
relations between producers and consumers depend. Instantaneous interactive 
communication permits transactions in an increasing number of services to occur at 
the same time but in different places. This allows overcoming the previously 
indispensable requirement of proximity between consumer and service supplier and 
thus increases the tradability of services. Furthermore, the growing interpenetration 
of services and goods in the supply and demand cycles means that any policy seeking 
the optimal allocation of productive resources must now take into consideration 
regulatory issues in both goods and services.
15
That being said, services are more vulnerable in regulations impeding their supply. 
Problems already start with the peculiar nature of services: services are typically 
non-tangible, non-storable, and above all heterogeneous with limited possibilities of 
mass production. In addition, many of the most ‘effective’ barriers to free movement 
of services relate to pre- or post-establishment of juridical and natural persons, as 
some kind of presence is still required.
16 In addition, quality, the ‘holy grail’ of every 
law or regulation governing services, is closely intertwined with the characteristics, 
qualifications, experience etc of each individual service provider. This trait of 
services regulations increases the transaction costs and undermines the pursuit of 
efficiency when regulating this highly diverse sector of the economy.  
From an economic viewpoint, an important eccentricity of the nature of protection in 
services industries also is that most of the barriers to trade in services have quota 
characteristics. Consequently, such barriers tend to create economic rents for 
incumbent service suppliers. This is inevitable, since quantitative restrictions 
generate artificial scarcity, which in turn leads to inflated prices and hence the 
creation of rents which induces incumbents to take action and strengthens their 
incentives to lobby to retain protection. 
COM(2001) 116 final, 28 February 2001. 
11 Inter alia, A. Mattoo, R. Rathindran and A. Subramanian, ‘Measuring Services Trade Liberalization 
and Its Impact on Economic Growth: An Illustration’ (2006) 21(1) Journal of Economic Integration,
64-98. 
12 Eurostat, Europe in Figures – Eurostat Yearbook 2008, p. 358. It bears mention that these date do 
not include sales of foreign affiliates, the so-called mode 3 under the GATS. 
13 Eurostat, ‘Statistics in Focus’, 57/2008. 
14 IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics.
15 P. Delimatsis, International Trade in Services and Domestic Regulations – Necessity, 
Transparency, and Regulatory Diversity (Oxford University Press, 2007), at 62-63. For this 
intermingling, compare C-390/99, Canal Satélite Digital 2002 ECR I-607, paras 31-33. 
16 Cf. P. Delimatsis, ‘Due Process and “Good” Regulation Embedded in the GATS – Disciplining 
Regulatory Behaviour in Services Through Article VI of the GATS’ (2007) 10(1) Journal of 
International Economic Law, 13-50, at 16. - 4 - 
The Services Directive ambitiously aims to change this situation and eliminate 
remaining legal barriers to the achievement of the internal market in services, while 
ensuring legal certainty for service suppliers and consumers. It adopts a horizontal 
approach based on the understanding that, while ubiquitous and diverse, several 
services sectors call for regulatory intervention to pursue a certain set of legitimate 
policy objectives such as consumer protection, the integrity of the profession, or 
ensuring the quality of the service, which appears to be common to more than one 
sectors.  
According to estimations made by the European Commission, this new framework, 
when transposed to national laws, is expected to increase the EU’s real GDP by 1.8% 
and to create 2.5 million additional jobs.
17 The objective of the directive is to enable 
both service suppliers and consumers to benefit from the fundamental freedoms 
guaranteed in Articles 43 and 49 ECT, that is, the freedom of establishment and the 
freedom to provide services in a cross-border manner.
18 In this respect, the directive 
consolidates previous European Court of Justice (ECJ) case-law on related issues. 
While numerous sectors are excluded from the scope of the Services Directive, the 
latter applies to business services and covers, inter alia, most of the regulated 
professions within the EU. In addition, and quite importantly, the directive adopts a 
sweeping definition of the term ‘requirements’ to cover ‘any obligation, prohibition, 
condition or limit provided for in the laws, regulations or administrative provisions 
of the Member States or in consequence of case-law, administrative practice, the 
rules of professional bodies, or the collective rules of professional associations or 
other professional organizations, adopted in the exercise of their legal autonomy’.
19
The directive calls for the creation of single contact points for service providers, the 
establishment or maintenance of electronic procedures, the promotion of the quality 
of the services supplied and the establishment of effective administrative co-
operation among the MS. It also requires the review of national legislation and calls 
for mutual evaluation reports at the end of the transposition period. While the final 
text of the Services Directive did not include the country of origin principle, which 
would have led to extensive mutual recognition,
20 the adopted version is still deemed 
a step forward, as it consolidates the legal framework for many services and has the 
potential to reduce the red tape and remaining barriers in the service sector, while 
promoting the modernization of practices and procedures, notably through the 
creation of one-stop shops. Furthermore, the directive incorporates both mandatory 
and voluntary, soft-law provisions,
21 reflecting the intense bargaining that preceded 
the adoption of the directive. For the remaining obstacles to the free movement of 
services and the freedom of establishment, the directive calls for the respect of the 
17 WTO, Trade Policy Review – European Communities, WT/TPR/S/177, 22 January 2007, p. 109. 
18 The Services Directive provides that suppliers already established in another MS cannot be 
prevented from providing their services in a given MS on the basis that they do not have an 
establishment in that MS (Art. 16:2(a)). For the sake of comparison, Art. 49 on the freedom to provide 
services is the equivalent of Mode 1, Mode 2 and Mode 4 under the GATS, since it covers the supply 
of services on a cross-border basis, the movement of consumer to the location of the supplier to 
receive the service and the temporary movement of the supplier in order for him to be able to supply 
the service in question in the host country. 
19 Art. 4:7) of the Services Directive. See also European Commission (DG Internal Market and 
Services), Handbook on Implementation of the Services Directive, 2007, p. 16. 
20 A. Mattoo and D. Mishra, ‘Foreign Professionals in the United States: Regulatory Impediments to 
Trade (2009) Journal of International Economic Law, pp. 13-14 (Advance access, visited 2 June 
2009). 
21 Sometimes within a single provision. Cf. Art. 26 of the Services Directive. - 5 - 
principles of necessity, proportionality, and non-discrimination. 
Rationae personae, the directive only applies to service suppliers that are nationals of 
an EU MS (for natural persons) and to legal persons within the meaning of Article 48 
ECT
22 who are established in an MS. On the other hand, services supplied by non-
nationals of an MS or by entities not established in any of the EU MS fall outside the 
ambit of the directive.
23 Nevertheless, while services and services suppliers from 
non-EU MS do not benefit directly from this new framework, the endeavors to 
simplify procedures and ‘screen’ unnecessary obstacles to the supply of services 
across the EU as a result of the implementation of this directive can reasonably be 
expected to generate indirect benefits for all non-EU services and service suppliers 
seeking to provide services within the EU.
24 It requires, for instance, that all EU MS 
assess the impact of their legislation at all levels and reconsider domestic rules and 
measures that are out of proportion to their objective and have negative effects on 
trade in services. In the medium term, this should be expected to lead to better 
regulation, the modernization of bureaucratic practices and the streamlining of 
administrative procedures that will also be beneficial for service suppliers originating 
in third countries. Therefore, even in the absence of the country of origin principle, 
the effect of the directive should not be underestimated and should rather be deemed 
a major step towards further developing mutual trust. Fighting ignorance of EC law 
at the national level and lack of transparency regarding MS’ national measures 
affecting the delivery of services as well as leveling the playing field with regard to 
the protection of public interest to a certain extent is an adequate way forward to 
further enhance trust among MS. Unfortunately, mutual confidence cannot come out 
of the blue and ‘invisible hands’ are simply a chimera when it comes to the cognitive 
part of trust, as exemplified by the ‘Polish plumber’ unfortunate narrative.  
C. The Mandate for the Creation of Pan-European Codes of Conduct  
The Services Directive calls for the creation of pan-European CoC. This initiative, 
however, highlights the fact that existing rules of conduct at a national level, while 
not discriminating on the basis of origin of the service supplier, can potentially 
constitute unnecessary barriers to the freedom to provide services and the freedom of 
establishment. This is so because they bring about regulatory asymmetries and 
market fragmentation, or otherwise impede the mobility of service suppliers or their 
ability to supply their services in a cross-border manner. As professionals 
increasingly supply their services across borders, the need for common sets of 
minimum rules of conduct which would determine the contours of the supply of a 
given service throughout the Union is becoming pressing with a view to achieving a 
genuine internal market for services. Ultimately, such sets of rules will ensure 
uniformity regarding the minimum level of consumer protection and a high quality of 
the services supplied at EU level.
25
Furthermore, adequately pursuing public policy objectives at Community level is 
22 Article 48 ECT makes reference to companies or other legal persons constituted according to the 
legislation of an MS which have their registered office, central administration or principal place of 
business within the EU. 
23 See also recital 37 of the Services Directive. 
24 See, for instance, Article 15 of the Services Directive. 
25 Handbook, supra note 19, p. 68. - 6 - 
essential in the pursuit of further enhancing trust between MS. Indeed, the current 
status quo with diverse CoC agreed on exclusively at a national level hints at a 
national perception of the quality of services. In addition, the fact that some 
professional associations in a given MS are not subject to a domestic CoC may create 
prejudice in other MS with regard to the quality of the services supplied by the 
members of these professional associations and ultimately lead to a certain distrust 
(in particular, when the services are supplied cross-border) and market 
fragmentation.
26 Therefore, the CoC’s function is twofold: they facilitate mobility of 
service suppliers (mobility-enabling function), but at the same time aim to enhance 
trust vis-à-vis services and service suppliers originating in other MS (confidence-
building function). Importantly, CoC will lead to the identification of a minimum, 
acceptable level of quality when a given service is supplied and, more importantly, to 
the emergence of a European concept of ‘quality of service’ in given services sectors 
which would be an identifiable trait of these sectors throughout and beyond the 
Union. 
The Services Directive incorporates a convergence programme aiming to, inter alia, 
targeted harmonization in specific areas such as the access to the activity of judicial 
recovery of debts or private security services and transport of cash and valuables. An 
important part of this chapter forms the mandate directed to the MS and the 
Commission to incite the establishment of pan-European CoC. Article 37 of the 
directive reads: 
Member States shall, in cooperation with the Commission, take 
accompanying measures to encourage the drawing up at Community level, 
particularly by professional bodies, organizations and associations, of codes 
of conduct aimed at facilitating the provision of services or the establishment 
of a provider in another Member State, in conformity with Community law.
In the absence of a top-down approach that the country of origin principle would 
substantiate, the directive puts the accent on the merits of a bottom-up approach 
where the private sector is called upon to exert a decisive role and serve the objective 
of furthering European integration. The call for the creation of CoC clearly is an 
element towards this direction. While technically forming part of Chapter VII of the 
directive, the mandate incorporated in Article 37 regarding the creation of pan-
European CoC is deemed an essential component of the directive’s most important 
objectives, as depicted notably in Chapter V of the directive, to improve the quality 
of the services supplied within the Union and to enhance transparency as to the 
conditions regulating the access to and the exercise of a given profession in the 
various MS.
27 Supplying services of high quality is rightfully considered as an 
essential prerequisite for the improvement of European competitiveness and the 
establishment of the Union as the best exporter of services worldwide, given the 
importance of services in the economies of all countries nowadays.  
CoC appear to be particularly relevant for the so-called ‘regulated professions’ 
within the EU legal order where also compulsory registration with the corresponding 
professional associations exists.
28 A regulated profession is ‘a professional activity or 
26 See European Commission (DG Internal Market and Services), ‘Enhancing the Quality of Services 
in the Internal Market: The Role of European Codes of Conduct’, 2007, p. 6. 
27 See Handbook, supra note 19, p. 62. 
28 The use of CoC seems to be appealing to other areas of services such as information society 
services.- 7 - 
group of professional activities, access to which, the pursuit of which, or one of the 
modes of pursuit of which is subject, directly or indirectly, by virtue of legislative, 
regulatory or administrative provisions to the possession of specific professional 
qualifications; in particular, the use of a professional title limited by legislative, 
regulatory or administrative provisions to holders of a given professional 
qualification shall constitute a mode of pursuit’.
29 Regulated professions have two 
important traits: First, registration with the professional association is compulsory. 
Second, these professions are self-regulated for the most part. Compulsory 
registration allows for sanctions against those professionals who do not abide by the 
rules established by the professional body, including deontological rules usually 
contained in the sectoral CoC. Of course, not all professions oblige the relevant 
individuals to register with the professional association. Nevertheless, the mandate of 
Article 37 is equally – if not more – important for non-regulated professions, as the 
uniformity of rules of ethics that apply to them across the Union can be even looser.  
A common set of rules in these professions will enhance quality and trust from the 
side of the consumers, while allowing for the identification of those who may be 
‘cheating’.
Because of the manifest abundance of non-governmental collective rules in this area, 
including CoC, MS and the Commission recognized the beneficial effects of drawing 
up common sets of rules pertaining to issues such as independence, impartiality or 
professional secrecy which would apply to a given profession exercised across the 
Union. As professional associations become the final ‘masters’ of the pursuit of the 
corresponding profession at a national level (setting both pre- and post-access-related 
rules), typically through a governmental act that delegates its regulatory powers to 
the associations, one can realize the positive effects that some alignment of the 
ethical or other rules regulating the profession may have for the EU services market 
integration. In addition, the risk of abuse may be particularly high in case where 
domestic suppliers, in their function as members of the domestic professional 
association, may be called upon to decide on the aptitude of a service supplier 
originating in another MS and intending to establish herself in that market or 
applying for an authorization to deliver her services in a cross-border manner.  
Furthermore, the creation of pan-European CoC would simplify the current 
conundrum with several national CoC applying to situations which go beyond 
national borders. For instance, take the case of the Lawyers Establishment 
Directive,
30 which establishes a mechanism for the mutual recognition of 
professional titles of migrant lawyers desiring to practise under their home-country 
professional title. The directive provides that a European lawyer must comply not 
only with the rules of professional conduct applicable in his home MS but also with 
those of the host MS, failing which she will incur disciplinary sanctions and 
exposure to professional liability.
31 Nevertheless, quid when these rules are 
conflicting? Or with services where it cannot be determined in which MS they are 
actually supplied?
32 The recognition of these problems calls for coherent solutions. 
29 Art. 3(1)(a) of the Directive 2005/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 
September 2005 on the recognition of professional qualifications 2005 OJ L 255/22. 
30 Directive 98/5 of the European Parliament and the Council of 16 February 1998 to facilitate practice 
of the profession of lawyer on a permanent basis in a Member State other than that in which the 
qualification was obtained 1998 OJ L 77/36. 
31 Ibid, Arts 6 and 7. 
32 For the sake of comparison, similar questions have been raised as to the distinction between Mode 1 
(cross-border supply) and Mode 2 (consumption abroad) under the General Agreement on Trade in - 8 - 
Finally, the nature of other rules such as for instance limitations on the types of 
services that can be supplied or on the legal form that such services are allowed to be 
supplied may have a dissuasive effect on professionals of other MS otherwise 
capable of exercising the fundamental freedoms enshrined in Articles 43 and 49 of 
the Treaty. 
The Services Directive does not contain any specific guidance with respect to the 
form of such CoC nor to their content. For instance, it does not attempt to give a hint 
of what ensuring the quality entails or what should be the level of protection 
pursued.
33 Rather, it bluntly spells out the telos of the mandate, that is, the facilitation 
of free movement pursuant to the Treaty.
34 Nevertheless, absent any further 
specifications under Article 37, the recitals preceding the main body of the directive 
are highly informative. Thus, it is first clarified that pan-European CoC should aim to 
ensure the quality of the service supplied and at the same time take into consideration 
the specificities of the profession at issue. In Article 26:3, the link is made between 
quality assurance, consumer protection and co-operation between professional bodies 
and consumer associations at Community level. This provision requires that MS, 
together with the Commission, enact appropriate measures to instigate co-operation 
of private associations at an EU level to promote the quality of services, notably by 
facilitating the proper assessment of the competence of a given provider. 
Diminishing the existing information asymmetries would lead to enhanced consumer 
protection and informed choices by consumers. Furthermore, their compatibility with 
legally binding rules relating to professional ethics and conduct at a national level 
and competition law at Community level should be ensured.
35
In more general terms, CoC typically codify traditional virtues that have demarcated 
a given profession for decades or even centuries
36 and spell out binding obligations 
adopted by governments, usually going beyond what law prescribes.
37 They 
comprise rules relating to independence, impartiality, loyalty, professional 
competence and integrity, trustworthiness, confidentiality, conflict of interest, 
charging of fees and professional secrecy. CoC typically include rules about 
desirable behaviour (value orientation) and rules about prohibited behaviour 
(compliance orientation).
38 Such rules are typically related to professional conduct, 
Services (GATS). 
33 The Court appears to be ready to accept the Commission deciding on the level of protection which 
may be acceptable at Community level, having regard to the public interest pursued by the various 
MS. See Case C-233/94, Germany v Parliament and Council 1997 ECR I-2405, paras 16 and 17; 
also C-168/98, Luxembourg v Parliament and Council 2000 ECR I-9131, paras 43-44. 
34 In this sense, CoC have a post-law function in that they supplement and support the practical 
application of secondary law, in casu, the Services Directive. At the same time, it can be argued that 
they are intended as an alternative to Community legislation and therefore they can also be deemed to 
have a para-law function. See L. Senden, Soft Law in European Community Law (Hart Publishing, 
2004), pp. 214-5. 
35 See recital 113 of the Services Directive. On the applicability of the EC competition rules to CoC, 
see below Section F. 
36 The Code of Professional Conduct, adopted by the Council of the Bars and Law Societies of the 
European Union (CCBE) in 1988 and most recently amended in 2006, underscores in its Art. 2.2 that 
trust and professional integrity are traditional virtues that constitute at the same time professional 
obligations. This Code is binding on any lawyer undertaking cross-border activities within Europe. 
37 For the purpose of this study, the concept of CoC should be considered as also encompassing 
elements that, in practice, may be found in quality charters. The latter comprise exclusively rules 
describing the manner in which the service is to be provided. 
38 See A. Nijhof, S. Cludts, O. Fisscher and A. Laan, ‘Measuring the Implementation of Codes of 
Conduct – An Assessment Method Based on a Process Approach of the Responsbile Organisation’ - 9 - 
but they may also call for a certain life style in private life.
39 Furthermore, depending 
on the specifics of the profession, they define the conflicting interests and ideally 
hierarchize them. For instance, Article 2.7 of the CCBE Code of Professional 
Conduct stipulates that the primary allegiance of a lawyer should be to her client, 
sacrificing her own interest and that of her colleagues.
40
In several professional services, such as legal, CoC may call for the conclusion of 
professional liability insurance for errors and omissions the cover of which will 
depend on the nature and extent of the risk.
41 As compliance with this latter rule is 
typically reflected in the final price of the service delivered, agreement on common 
rules appears to be essential to avoid unfair price-based competition. For instance, 
competition can be distorted when domestic professionals are obliged to conclude 
such insurance, whereas cross-border suppliers or suppliers temporarily providing 
their services may not be bound by such a rule in their home state. The latter do not 
have to internalize any insurance cost in the final cost of their service and thus can 
offer it at a lower price.  
CoC often also include provisions on disciplinary sanctions in case the rules are not 
abided by, although usually this deterrent is only used in abstracto and mentioned as 
a mere possibility.
42 However, civil or even penal sanctions cannot be excluded in 
the case of serious infringement.
43 CoC can also be used by Courts at least as 
supplementary evidence or means of interpretation.
44 This can be another reason why 
professional associations may be tempted to accentuate the importance and 
uniqueness of their profession for the entire society which may justify a different 
treatment from state public regulatory authorities and Courts at the national or, in
casu, supranational level.
45
Thus, CoC serve an imperative function for a given services (sub-)sector: 
Enunciating visibly its professional norms and reassuring external parties 
(consumers, colleagues, the government and the society overall) of the integrity, 
competence and the high standards enforced and maintained in the sector.
46 Rules 
incorporated in CoC thus aim to codify obligations that the professionals have to 
abide by to deserve the trust of their clients and the society overall. By adhering to 
such standards, professionals become trustworthy. The CCBE Code of Conduct is 
again revealing in this respect when it emphasizes the role of legal professional 
privilege noting that ‘confidentiality is…a primary and fundamental right and duty 
of the lawyer’ and that ‘without the certainty of confidentiality there cannot be 
(2003) 45 Journal of Business Ethics 65, at 66. 
39 For instance, Art. 2 of the International Code of Ethics adopted by the International Bar Association 
(IBA) in 1956 and amended in 1988 provides that:  
Lawyers shall at all times maintain the honour and dignity of their porfession. They shall, in 
practice as well as in private life, abstain from any behaviour which may tend to discredit the 
profession of which they are members. 
40 See supra note 36. 
41 The Services Directive hints at this possibility and the need for the conclusion of professional 
insurance cover. See recitals 98, 99 and Art. 23 of the Directive. 
42 See Art. 1.2.1 of the CCBE Code of Professional Conduct, supra note 36. 
43 See European Commission, supra note 26, p. 9. 
44 Cf. C-506/04, Wilson 2006 ECR I-8613, para. 65. 
45 Cf. Art. 1.1 of the CCBE Code of Professional Conduct, supra note 36. 
46 See N. Higgs-Kleyn and D. Kapelianis, ‘The Role of Professional Codes in Regulating Ethical 
Conduct’ (1999) 19 Journal of Business Ethics 363, at 364. - 10 - 
trust’.
47 Indeed, confidentiality and professional secrecy protect the client from 
indiscrete disclosures which may harm his integrity and reputation.
48 Interestingly, 
the Code goes on to suggest that the respect of this principle not only does it serve 
the interest of the client, but also the interest of the administration of justice and 
therefore deserves to be protected by the State
49. In AM & S,
50 the ECJ also 
concurred with this view and upheld the principle of confidentiality of written 
communications between lawyers and clients. More generally, confidentiality and 
professional secrecy is ‘an obligation of discretion forming part of the ethics of a 
profession’.
51
Viewed under this angle, CoC also describe the conduct which the services recipients 
are entitled to receive from the professionals abiding by the CoC. Surely, the role of 
the governing professional body is crucial on this score due to its autonomous, self-
regulatory power and the control that it exerts over its members. Professional bodies 
are there to ensure that professional traditions are adhered to. In Cipolla, the 
Commission implicitly referred to rules included in CoC for the legal profession in a 
favourable manner. More specifically, it contended that ‘quasi-legislative rules, such 
as, inter alia, rules on access to the legal profession, disciplinary rules serving to 
ensure compliance with professional ethics and rules on civil liability have, by 
maintaining a high qualitative standard for the services provided by such 
professionals which those measures guarantee, a direct relationship of cause and 
effect with the protection of lawyers’ clients and the proper working of the 
administration of justice’.
52
In addition to these basic fiduciary standards, of particular importance for our 
purposes are two areas where the directive contains fairly detailed rules on the 
legality of restrictions: the first relates to commercial communications while the 
second refers to the establishment of multidisciplinary practices. 
Rules governing commercial communications typically form part of CoC in several 
services sectors.
53 In the Commission’s report on ‘the State of the Internal Market for 
Services’, the distortive effect of restrictive and detailed rules for such 
communications ranging from outright prohibitions on advertising to strict control of 
content was highlighted. Such restrictions are particularly burdensome for 
professionals or legal persons who are not established in a given jurisdiction and thus 
their only option to become known in that market is through this type of promotional 
47 See Art. 2.3.1 of the CCBE Code of Professional Conduct, supra note 36. 
48 See Opinion of AG Maduro in Case C-305/05, Ordre des barreaux francophones and 
germanophones and others 2007 ECR I-5305, point 41. 
49 Cf. ECHR Judgment on Foxley v. United Kingdom of 20 June 2000, para. 50. 
50 155/79, AM & S 1982 ECR 1575. 
51 See Opinion of AG Maduro in Case C-305/05, Ordre des barreaux francophones and 
germanophones and others 2007 ECR I-5305, point 37. 
52 Joined Cases C-94/04 and C-202/04, para. 63. 
53 Commercial communication includes any form of communication designed to promote, directly or 
indirectly, the goods, services or image of an undertaking, organization or person engaged in 
commercial, industrial or craft activity or practising a regulated profession. See Art. 4(12) of the 
Services Directive. According to the Handbook, not only advertisitng but also other means of 
communication such as business cards mentioning the title and the specialty of the service supplier 
should be regarded as coming under this definition. See Handbook, p. 65. This, however, is too broad 
an interpretation. A business card, contrary to a prospectus or a brochure, would merely refer to 
factual information relating to the titles of the supplier or his contact details such as professional 
address and phone number. Therefore, it is argued that business cards would probably fit into the 
exception of Article 4(12)(a) of the Directive.  - 11 - 
activities. Contrary to the case of goods, such rules impede the pursuance of a pan-
European promotional campaign. The report identified the existence of such 
limitations in several sectors such as business (where most of the regulated 
professions are classified), distribution, telecommunication, or financial services.
54
Article 24 of the Services Directive invites MS (but also professional bodies and 
private associations regulating the pursuit of a given profession in a collective 
manner) to remove all outright bans on commercial communications by the regulated 
professions, such as bans of all advertising in one or more media of 
communication.
55 The link with codes of conduct is made in paragraph 2 of Article 
24 which requires MS to ensure that communications of this type are consistent with 
professional rules which are in conformity with EC law. These rules, usually 
enshrined in voluntary CoC, set rules, conditions and qualifications with respect to 
the independence, dignity and integrity of the profession or the adequate conduct 
relating to professional secrecy. The directive requires that such rules be non-
discriminatory, justified by an overriding public interest requirement and compatible 
with the principle of proportionality. In addition, they have to be specific to the 
nature of the profession at issue. This specificity requirement calls for a case-by-case 
analysis of rules limiting commercial communications. The directive acknowledges 
the need for a bottom-up approach whereby the professionals themselves should 
agree on pan-European rules governing the adequacy of the content and methods of 
commercial communications in their respective profession, which will form integral 
part of the pan-European CoC for this profession.
56
Another element that was identified in the Commission’s report on the ‘State of the 
Internal Market for Services’ and picked up in the Services Directive is the 
consistency of restrictions or limitations relating to multidisciplinary practices with 
EC law. Article 25 of the Services Directive seeks the removal of requirements 
limiting the exercise of different activities jointly or in partnership where such 
restrictions are not necessary to ensure the impartiality, independence and integrity 
of the regulated professions or to guarantee compliance with the rules governing 
professional ethics and conduct.
57 The directive further specifies that several 
restrictions on such partnerships can be tolerated such as certification, accreditation, 
technical monitoring and testing services insofar as a close link with the objective of 
ensuring the independence and impartiality of the providers in question is 
established.
58 In the case, however, where MS decide to allow the creation of 
multidisciplinary partnerships, the directive requires that MS guarantee the 
prevention of conflicts of interest and the independence and impartiality of the 
providers. Importantly, the directive alludes to the findings of the Wouters case by 
reminding the importance of adopting rules of professional ethics and conduct, 
typically incorporated in professional CoC, which are compatible between the 
activities that are represented in these partnerships, especially when professional 
secrecy may be put in jeopardy.
59 In addition, and again based on the Court’s 
54 European Commission, ‘The State of the Internal Market for Services’, supra note 2, pp. 27-29. 
55 See also recital 100 of the Services Directive. 
56 Ibid. 
57 See recital 101 of the Services Directive.  
58 According to Arts 25:3 and 39 of the Directive setting a framework for mutual evaluation of laws 
and regulations in the area of services, MS shall evaluate existing restrictions and explain why they 
consider them as being justified, including why less restrictive means are not available in this respect. 
See Handbook, p. 66. 
59 In Wouters, the Court emphasized that restrictions relating to the creation of multidisciplinary - 12 - 
findings in Wouters and the directive, a separate examination of the specific nature of 
the relevant professions is warranted to uphold or deny the legality of restrictions 
against multidisciplinary practices.
60
The directive calls for reviewing and assessing the relevant legislation, inter alia, 
relating to multidisciplinary activities against the conditions set out by the directive. 
As noted earlier, this screening process is bound to cover all relevant rules of 
professional bodies or collective rules of professional associations or any 
professional organizations which are adopted in the exercise of their right of self-
regulating their profession. Requirements to be reviewed equally include rules 
adopted at all levels of government. Ideally, this process should lead to strong 
harmonization forces to ensure equivalent protection across the Union and ascertain a 
certain level of mutual trust to eliminate obstacles to the freedom to provide 
services.
61 Harmonization with regard to rules of multidisciplinary partnerships will 
also decrease the compliance costs for those service suppliers which have already 
adopted this business model in one MS, but due to restrictions in other MS, they 
cannot exercise their fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty.
62 In fact, 
nowadays the clientele is more sophisticated and thus the delivery of a gamut of 
services such as legal, accounting and tax advice within the same house renders the 
latter fairly attractive.
63 Moreover, restrictions on such partnerships may be more 
justified in certain services and less in others. Putting Wouters aside, it seems that 
there are feeble arguments justifying restrictions in partnerships between architects 
and engineers where the independence of the professional may not be as important as 
in other services such as legal or accounting. Under this perspective, minimum 
harmonization and the adoption of objective conditions across the Union appears to 
be compelling to allow the development of economies of scale and enhance the 
productivity of service suppliers through this type of synergy. 
It follows that, although the directive adopts a rather liberal approach vis-à-vis the 
content of CoC allowing for a considerable room for manoeuvre to professional 
bodies to self-regulate their industry and establish deontological rules in co-
ordination with their counterparts in other MS, it adopts a more meddling stance 
towards the need for common rules relating to commercial communications and 
multidisciplinary practices. Thus, the semantics are obvious: The chances that these 
categories of rules hinder the establishment of a genuine internal market and distort 
competition are high and therefore particular attention and action at Community level 
is warranted.  
In all other respects, professional associations are called upon to set up pan-European 
CoC for their respective discipline taking into account the peculiarities of their 
profession and ensuring that rules guaranteeing independence, impartiality, integrity 
and professional secrecy are agreed upon.
64 While the directive remains silent as to 
practices can be justified if the activities in question are not bound by comparable requirements of 
professional conduct, in casu of professional secrecy. See Case C-309/99, Wouters 2002 ECR I-
1577, para. 104. 
60 Ibid, paras 101-103. For the most important types of restrictions under this category, see European 
Commission, ‘The State of the Internal Market for Services’, supra note 2, p. 19. 
61 See Proposal, supra note 1, p. 4. 
62 See European Commission, ‘Extended Impact Assessment of Proposal for a Directive on Services 
in the Internal Market’, Commission Staff Working Paper, SEC(2004) 21, 13 January 2004, p. 20. 
63 What the ECJ called ‘one stop shop advantage’ in Wouters, para. 87; Also WTO, Council for Trade 
in Services, ‘Legal Services’, Background Note by the Secretariat, S/C/W/43, 6 July 1998, p. 14. 
64 See recital 114 of the Directive. - 13 - 
the appropriate method to follow to draw up a CoC, the Commission draws attention 
to the significance of conforming to principles of good governance during that 
process.
65 The procedures should be open, publicly accessible, fair, non-
discriminatory and objective. They should be communicated in advance to all 
professionals involved to ensure transparency, inclusiveness and representativeness. 
However, it is for the MS to take all the necessary measures to encourage 
professionals to implement at national level these CoC. Of course, MS are allowed to 
take more stringent measures if they consider that the level of protection adopted at 
Community level is not commensurate with domestic desires and needs. By the same 
token, domestic professional bodies can seek higher levels of protection in their 
existing or future national CoC.
66 Viewed through this angle, then, pan-European and 
national CoC can co-exist and complement each other. Nevertheless, in order not to 
deprive of its effet utile the directive and the mandate relating to the creation of pan-
European CoC, MS and/or professional bodies should be able to explain the 
particular situations that justify the stringency of the rules or conditions at the 
national level. The Commission, assisted by the Article 40 Committee, will be in 
charge of supervising the implementation of the directive and receiving notifications 
as to changes in laws, regulations, and requirements adopted by both public bodies 
and private bodies which, in the exercise of their legal autonomy, are allowed to 
adopt rules in a collective manner. 
The creation of CoC becomes a shared obligation of MS and the Commission, which 
cannot be materialized without the active involvement of the private parties affected 
(or their associations) pursuant to Article 37. This tripartite approach brings together 
the most important actors in the regulation of business services across the Union. Just 
as under Article 26 where Members are required to encourage action by private 
parties,
67 Article 37 requires that MS, in co-operation with the Commission and 
obviously with associations representing service suppliers such as professional 
bodies or chambers of commerce as well as consumer associations, take practical 
steps so that service suppliers and professional associations create CoC at 
Community level to enable full use of the freedom to provide services and the 
freedom of establishment.  
It bears mention that this privileged role of the Commission is ordained not only by 
its function as Hüterin der Verträge, but also in the aftermath of the Interinstitutional 
Agreement of 2003 on better lawmaking.
68 In this Agreement, a central role was 
entrusted to the Commission when recourse is made to alternative methods of 
regulation. Indeed, paragraph 17 of the Agreement provides that it is for the 
Commission to ensure that ‘any use of co-regulation or self-regulation is always 
consistent with Community law and that it meets the criteria of transparency (in 
particular the publicising of agreements) and representativeness of the parties 
involved.’ In this respect, the Commission conducted a public on-line consultation in 
summer 2007 inviting professional organizations to submit information on their 
current CoC in force or under preparation, if applicable, and to express their views as 
65 European Commission, supra note 26, p. 10. 
66 See recital 115 of the Directive. 
67 For instance, under Art. 26:1(b), MS, backed by the Commission, have to encourage service 
providers and their associations to draw up their own quality charters or labels at Community level. In 
addition, under Art. 26:5 of the Directive, the development of voluntary (obviously industry-driven) 
compatibility standards at Community level should be actively encouraged. 
68 European Parliament/Council/Commission, ‘Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-making’ 
2003 OJ C 321/1. - 14 - 
to the most adequate content of such codes within their respective disciplines. The 
involvement of the Commission will be in all likelihood all the more active when 
self-regulation comes as a substitute for Community action in an area that comes 
under the competence of the Community, such as the creation of a genuine internal 
market for services and its proper functioning. In addition, the Commission will 
report to the other EU legislating institutions on the successes or failures of this 
experimentalist regulatory power transfer.  
A weakness of the directive in its present form is that it does not set specific 
deadlines for the realization of the mandate. In the initial proposal, Article 40:2(b) 
required that the Commission shall intervene to propose solutions in cases where ‘it 
has not been possible to finalise codes of conduct before the date of transposition 
this would mean by the end of 2009 or for which such codes are insufficient to 
ensure the proper functioning of the Internal Market’. Obviously, a more nuanced 
and flexible stance is adopted in the final text of the directive whereby the role of the 
Commission is downgraded, whereas the optimism of finalizing some pan-European 
CoC is not reiterated. This absence of deadlines can be partly explained by the 
immense differences among services sectors that exist in practice with regard to co-
ordinated efforts at Community level. Hence, choosing a less prescriptive approach 
was imposed by the reality. While 50% of the European professional organizations 
have already drawn up a European CoC for their profession,
69 others are not that 
advanced or successful in their efforts to create such CoC.
70 In addition, one can 
infer that the Commission is not always satisfied with existing CoC, as several of 
them do not appear to have respected basic standards of transparency, participation, 
representativeness, integration or responsibility.
71 This would manifestly mean that, 
insofar as CoC created at Community level are explicitly warranted and thus the role 
of CoC should be view from now on under a new perspective, existing CoC would 
need to be revisited to ensure that their creation complies with fundamental 
principles of good governance. 
D. (European) Governance without (European) government: Alternative 
methods of regulation and harmonization of professional standards in the 
EU
The peculiar nature of services calls for the adoption of different regulatory 
approaches than those used in the goods’ realm.
72 Contrary to the majority of goods, 
services are considered as being experience goods or even credence (or trust) goods,
73 as their quality cannot be evaluated until they are consumed or even years after the 
purchase took place due to asymmetries of information between the service supplier 
(agent) and the consumer (principal). This information asymmetry may lead to 
69 See, for instance, the code of the Architects’ Council of Europe and the European Tax Federation. 
70 See European Commission, supra note 26, p. 10. 
71 Ibid.   
72 Delimatsis, supra note 15, pp. 87ff. 
73 P Nelson, ‘Information and Consumer Behavior’ (1970) 78(2) Journal of Political Economy 311; 
also GA Akerlof, ‘The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism’ (1970) 
84(3) The Quarterly Journal of Economics 488; and MR Darby and E Karni, ‘Free Competition and 
the Optimal Amount of Fraud’ (1973) 16(1) Journal of Law and Economics 67. Darby and Karni 
actually demonstrate that in the case of goods that have credence qualities, a governmental 
intervention would not lead to an efficient allocation of resources and thus would be preferable to 
leave the market unregulated. - 15 - 
adverse selection and decline of quality as a result of competition based exclusively 
on price.
74 Several professional services (e.g legal, accounting, notaries) also have 
the public good characteristics of non-rivalry and non-exclusivity. They are 
important for the smooth supply of other services but also for the society and the 
unproblematic function of the economy overall. 
Therefore, when the market itself does not sufficiently protect the relevant values, 
political decision-making proceeds to an evaluation of the situation in the market 
and, ultimately, it overrides it.
75 More specifically, the governmental intervention 
will prescribe the type of information that needs to be provided and will aid potential 
buyers to evaluate the information that is being supplied. Licensure, certification 
procedures, minimum harmonization, or liability laws are usual governmental 
instruments to ensure competence, performance, technical behaviour and 
accountability.
76 The primary advantage of legislation, then, is that, due to its 
inherently coercive qualities, it can improve resource allocation or aid to obtain other 
benefits in cases where markets are incapable of achieving these objectives on their 
own. 
Overcoming the concern that self-regulation may be the ultimate form of regulatory 
capture and delegating regulatory power to professional bodies can constitute 
legitimizing a cartel with wide ability to determine or influence the regulatory 
framework to the benefit of professionals/members of the ‘club’ but to the detriment 
of consumers,
77 the European Union has gradually moved towards and encouraged 
the introduction of new forms of governance, also driven from the notorious 
principle of subsidiarity
78 and the Interinstitutional Agreement of 2003 on better law-
making.
79 Previously, the White Paper on European Governance submitted by the 
Commission in 2001, initiating its ‘Better Regulation Initiative’ had also hinted at the 
way forward by recognizing that ‘legislation is often only part of a broader solution’ 
and that non-binding rules can be equally important for the attainment of a given 
objective.
80 Such statements were in line with the paradigm shift in domestic 
administrative laws and practices across developed countries in Europe and North 
America towards less rigidity and more power-sharing with those parties which had 
been asked for so many years to abide by the law without having participated or 
being asked of their views during its preparation.
81
Abandoning the previous fairly rigid top-down approach and in a clear shift away 
from hierarchical forms of governing,
82 the Union adopted a new legislative culture 
according to which consultations enhance the involvement of interested parties and 
74 Cf. Akerlof, supra note 73. 
75 If the market remains unregulated this would lead to a lowering of standards, as consumers would 
not be able to distinguish between low-quality and high-quality services. See also A. Ogus, 
Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory (Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 216. 
76 Also OECD, ‘Competition in Professional Services’, DAFFE/CLP(2000)2, 2000, 18ff. 
77 Cf. M. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Harvard 
University Press, 1965). 
78 See also Lisbon European Council, Presidency conclusions, 23-24 March 2000, para. 38. 
79 European Parliament/Council/Commission, ‘Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-making’ 
2003 OJ C 321/1. 
80 European Commission, ‘European Governance – A White Paper’ COM(2001)428, 25 July 2001, p. 
20.
81 Cf. J. Scott and D. Trubek, ‘Mind the Gap: Law and New Approaches to Governance in the 
European Union’ (2002) 8 European Law Journal 1, at 8. 
82 P. Craig and G. de Búrca, EU Law – Text, Cases, and Materials (Oxford University Press, 2008) 
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improve the quality of the policy outcome,
83 whereas alternative modes of regulation 
of both legislative and non-legislative nature enacted at the periphery complement 
and sometimes replace legislative action at Community level to achieve the 
objectives more effectively.
84 Such instruments can be those provided by the Treaty 
such as regulation, directive, recommendation, but also emerging ones such as co-
regulation, self-regulation, voluntary sectoral agreements and codes of conduct, open 
method of co-ordination, financial assistance, or information campaigns.
85 The 
binary objective of diversifying the Union’s regulatory instruments and simplifying 
and improving the regulatory environment are essentially driven by the concern to 
improve the effectiveness, legitimacy, transparency and legal certainty of regulation 
within the Union.
86 The experimentation with these instruments, nevertheless, must 
ensure swift and flexible regulation without affecting the EU competition rules or the 
unity of the internal market. 
The Interinstitutional Agreement of 2003 provides with further clarifications as to the 
scope of the instrument of self-regulation and the framework within which it is 
expected to be utilized. The Agreement defines self-regulation as ‘the possibility for 
economic operators, the social partners, non-governmental organizations or 
associations to adopt amongst themselves and for themselves common guidelines at 
European level’. Contrary to co-regulation, self-regulation does not involve a 
legislative act and is essentially voluntary.
87 Self-regulation leads to soft-law 
creation, soft law being defined as ‘rules of conduct, that are laid down in 
instruments which have not been attributed legally binding force as such, but 
nevertheless may have certain (indirect) legal effects, and that are aimed at and may 
produce practical effects’.
88 Self-regulation is more often than not a deliberate 
delegation of regulatory authority conceded by the State over a given activity to a 
body which is composed of representatives of that activity. As examples of self-
regulation the Agreement makes explicit reference to codes of practice and sectoral 
agreements.
89 The Agreement goes on to make clear that the choice of such a 
voluntary, decentralized instrument does not imply any preferred solutions by the 
European Institutions nor does it preclude any future action by them. For instance, 
the Agreement stipulates that recourse to a legislative act based on a proposal by the 
Commission may be necessary when the self-regulatory body fails to comply with 
83 European Commission, ‘Towards a reinforced culture of consultation and dialogue – General 
principles and minimum standards for consultation of interested parties by the Commission’, 
COM(2002)704, 11 December 2002, p. 5. The Lisbon Treaty formalizes and generalizes the duty of 
the Commission to consult with civil society ‘to ensure that the Union’s actions are coherent and 
transparent’. See Art. 11 of the Treaty on European Union. 
84 This is in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity which suggests that the Community has to 
legislate ‘only to the extent necessary’. See Protocol No 30 of the Treaty on the application of the 
principlies of subsidiarity and proportionality. The Protocol goes on to stipulate that ‘where 
appropriate and subject to the need for proper enforcement, Community measures should provide 
Member States with alternatives ways to achieve the objectives of the measures’. Ibid, para. 7. 
85 See European Commission, ‘Action Plan “Simplifying and Improving the Regulatory 
Environment”’, COM(2002)278, 5 June 2002, p. 7. 
86 N. Walker and G. de Búrca, ‘Reconceiving Law and New Governance’ (2007) 13 Columbia 
Journal of European Law 519. 
87 European Commission, supra note 85, p. 11. In the literature, however, several scholars consider the 
creation of CoC by the industry as a form of co-regulation. See, inter alia, F. Bignami, ‘Three 
Generations of Participation Rights before the European Commission’ (2004) Law and Contemporary 
Problems 61, at 74. 
88 Senden, supra note 34, p. 112. 
89 Interinstitutional Agreement, para. 22. - 17 - 
the Treaty or when the competent legislative authority requests it. This is yet another 
piece of evidence that the Classic Community Method is hale and hearty. 
Paradoxically at first blush, this recognition demonstrates that, at least potentially, 
regulations remain the ultimate powerful tool to fix problematic situations across the 
Union. They constitute an instrument that the Community institutions are not ready 
to abandon so light-heartedly – and justifiably so.  
As noted earlier, the Commission’s institutional role dictates that it closely 
supervises self-regulation practices to ensure compliance with the Treaty.
90 Notably, 
the Commission should ascertain the contribution of self-regulation practices to the 
realization of the Treaty objectives, but also their legitimacy. As conventional legal 
theory would deny to self-regulation a role equal to an independent source of law, the 
growing impact of private rule-making is part of contemporary reality and inevitably 
raises the issue of its legitimacy. In this regard, the Commission is bound to examine 
the extent of representatives of the parties concerned, the sectoral and geographical 
cover and the added value of the commitments at stake.
91
Against this backdrop, the creation of pan-European CoC forms part of the non-
legislative implementing measures that MS are called upon to take and arguably of a 
broader paradigm shift in EU regulatory making, dating back to the White Paper on 
European governance and the Commission’s Action Plan on better lawmaking. 
Moving away from command-and-control regulation, the Services Directive adopts a 
mix of regulatory techniques, ranging from targeted harmonization where 
divergences are too wide to be maintained to alternative methods of regulation where 
the Union recognizes the reality of self-regulation in many business services and 
calls upon affected privates and their associations to participate in rules-shaping and 
decide on a common, pan-European set of rules on professional ethics and conduct of 
non-coercive nature that suits them best.
92
A public-interest theory approach would also suggest that conceding regulatory 
powers to the suppliers concerned would be the most cost-efficient solution due to 
the specialized knowledge of the professionals and their organized bodies, notably 
when it comes to distinguishing between high-quality and poor-quality services and 
service suppliers, but also because of the professionals’ ability to react more quickly 
and flexibly to new circumstances and adapt or revise their rules.
93 In addition, this 
type of alternative method of regulation is likely to allow for greater room for input, 
adaptation, and revision both from the part of those creating the rules and those 
subjected to the rules. Moreover, the choice of this type of instruments leads to wider 
ownership of the policies at stake, which appears quintessential when it comes to 
enforcement and compliance with rules of non-binding nature.  
Furthermore, CoC have been traditionally seen with suspicion, as an attempt of the 
industries at issue to forestall state interference.
94 However one cannot turn the back 
90 Cf. the EU self- and co-regulation database in the homepage of the European Economic and Social 
Committee (EESC), available at: http://eesc.europa.eu/self-and-coregulation/index.asp.
91 Ibid, para. 23. 
92 See Proposal, supra note 1, p. 9. 
93 The Mandelkern Report used as ultimate criterion the satisfaction of the user and suggested that 
public intervention may be warranted only when the user is not satisfied. See Mandelkern Group on 
Better Regulation – Final Report, 2001, pp. 14-15. 
94 For this opinion, as it applies in the self-regulation of the legal profession and why in this sector co-
regulation may be preferable, see F. C. Zacharias, ‘The Myth of Self-Regulation’ (2009) 93 Minnesota 
Law Review 1147, at 1173. - 18 - 
to reality: As Cutler puts it, ‘a growing asymmetry or disjuncture between the formal 
legal status of private participants and their actual, political significance is growing 
more acute, portending a crisis of legitimacy’.
95 Nowadays, legitimizing influential 
rules set out in the exercise of private authority which may be by now de facto 
binding and complied with by the individuals/members to the professional 
associations becomes pressing. Instead of trying to disregard their existence and 
prominent role in everyday exercise of manifold professions and applying policies of 
exclusion, contemporary demands of participatory democracy would rather require 
an inclusive approach leading to the integration of these voices in rule-making and -
shaping.
96 Whereas allowing professional bodies to regulate their own matters boils 
down to a question of social coherence, this upgrading of the role of private authority 
also calls for reforms and restructuring to ensure compliance with current demands 
for internal and external transparency, due process, legitimacy, accountability, 
fairness and inclusiveness. Such reforms also seem to be warranted in the process of 
implementing the Services Directive at the national level. Indeed, the directive 
includes several important transparency obligations referring to the conduct of the 
competent authorities. The definition of ‘competent authority’ is sufficiently 
comprehensive to also include ‘…professional bodies, and those professional 
associations or other professional organizations which, in the exercise of their legal 
autonomy, regulate in a collective manner access to service activities or the exercise 
thereof’.
97
Another, perhaps more practice-oriented justification inherent in the mandate for the 
creation of pan-European CoC is the internationalization of the professions and the 
subsequent relativization of borders and jurisdictions.
98 The desire inherent in this 
mandate is that, where Community institutions have largely failed, private rule-
making may provide with solutions that will come from the fated need of the 
business to expand across borders and the increasing demands of customers for first-
rate delivery of services regardless of geographical borders and competent fori.
Regarding the harmonization of professional standards within the EU, the 
Community gradually replaced its strategy of adopting harmonization legislation 
enshrined in vertical directives during the ’70s and mid-’80s with horizontal 
directives, applying across services  sectors.
99 Those horizontal directives came in 
the aftermath of important decisions delivered by the Court relating to the principle 
of mutual recognition.
100 However, the general system directives fell short of 
ensuring recognition; they rather obliged MS to take into account qualifications and, 
if needed, impose additional requirements to achieve equivalence with nationals 
holding national titles. The new Directive on the recognition of professional 
qualifications, replacing all previous ones, aims to introduce a more flexible and 
automatic procedure which uses as a basis common platforms established by 
95 See A. C. Cutler, Private Power and Global Authority – Transnational Merchant Law in the Global 
Political Economy (Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 195. 
96 After all, participation is one out of the five principles of good governance identified in the 
Commission’s White Paper on Governance. 
97 See Art. 4(9) of the Services Directive. 
98 Cf. with respect to legal services, C-193/05, Commission v Luxembourg 2006 ECR I-8673, para. 
45.
99 Directives 89/48 1989 OJ L 19/16 and 92/51 1992 OJ L 209/25. 
100 Most notably, Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral (Cassis de Dijon) 1979 ECR 649; and C-340/89, 
Vlassopoulou 1991 ECR I-2357. - 19 - 
professional associations.
101 As a result of Directive 2005/36/EC on the recognition 
of professional qualifications, significant reforms in all EU MS regarding 
professional services were discussed with a view to fostering competition.
102 By 
recognizing the professional qualifications of a given individual, the host MS allows 
her to gain access in that MS to the same profession as that for which she is qualified 
in the home MS and to pursue it under the same conditions as the nationals. The 
profession can be considered as being the same if the activities are ‘comparable’.  
In cases where the horizontal directive does not apply, the principles outlined by the 
ECJ in Gebhard, Heylens, Vlassopoulou, Aranitis and Bobadilla will still apply. This 
means that EC primary law continues to give guidance as to the proper modus 
operandi.
103 Indeed, as underlined in Dreessen, the object of the horizontal directives 
on recognition of qualifications should not be ‘to make recognition of diplomas, 
certificates and other evidence of formal qualifications more difficult in situations 
falling outside their scope, nor may they have such an effect’. 
104 More specifically, 
Article 43 requires that the national competent authorities take into consideration the 
knowledge, diplomas,  certificates, qualifications and experience already recognized 
or acquired in another MS, give adequate reasons in case of non-recognition and 
allow for access to an effective judicial remedy. A similar type of comparison may 
also be warranted in the case of EU nationals who acquired formal qualifications and 
practical experience in a third country.
105 In practice, the Court will undertake a very 
broad interpretation of the fundamental freedom enshrined in Article 43 to outlaw 
any requirement which is liable to hinder or make less attractive the exercise of the 
right of establishment unless it is justified based on legitimate policy grounds and 
proportionate to the objective pursued.
106
E. Applicability of Article 43 and 49 ECT to private action 
Just as other soft-law instruments, CoC can support a normative discourse similar to 
hard law. While violations of legal obligations are perhaps more striking, soft 
undertakings can stimulate ‘accountability politics’ provided that they entail manifest 
normative commitments.
107 Thus a strategy of ‘name and shame’ can be very 
effective, notably in the area of professional services where individualism and 
personal reputation are still significant. As the boundaries between state, legally 
binding action and private, essentially voluntary action are increasingly blurred and 
private authority sometimes emerges as a law-maker of similar effectiveness to 
public authority, the scope rationae materiae and the value of the fundamental 
freedoms is growing. It is commonplace now that the fragmentation of the internal 
market for services also is the inevitable result of the divergent standards adopted by 
101 C. Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU – The Four Freedoms (Oxford University Press, 2007), 
p. 323. 
102 Several of these proposed reforms have been discussed in the European Commission, ‘Progress by 
Member States in reviewing and eliminating restrictions to Competition in the area of Professional 
Services’, Commission Staff Working Document, COM(2005)405 final, 5 September 2005. 
103 See, for instance, C-531/06, Commission v Italy (not yet published), paras 35, 37. 
104 C-31/00, Dreessen 2002 ECR I-663, para. 26. 
105 See, inter alia, C-238/98, Hocsman 2000 ECR I-6623, para. 35. 
106 See C-108/96, Mac-Quen 2001 ECR I-837, paras 24-26; and C-370/05, Festersen 2007 ECR 
I1129, para. 26. 
107 See K. W. Abbott and D. Snidal, ‘ Hard and Soft Law in International Governance’ (2000) 54 
International Organization 421, at 452. - 20 - 
non-public bodies in MS, such as professional associations, sport federations, the 
social partners drawing up collective agreements, or interested parties or groups 
drawing up CoC or collective rules in the exercise of their legal autonomy.  
Settled case-law of the ECJ makes clear that neutralizing the abolition of State 
barriers to market integration through obstacles stemming from rules (or the 
application thereof) set out by associations or organizations not governed by public 
law that are entrusted with broad legal autonomy and regulatory power cannot be 
allowed.
108 Indeed, rules of any nature set out by private bodies aimed at regulating 
gainful (self-) employment and the supply of services in a collective manner can 
impede the functioning of the internal market and thus come within the purview of 
the Treaty fundamental freedom provisions.
109
Recognizing the fact that activities of market participants can be restricted not only 
by action taken by MS authorities but also by private action, the ECJ interpreted the 
fundamental freedoms in a broad manner with a view to enabling market participants 
to have equal opportunities to gain access anywhere throughout the Community. 
Hence, the traditional approach that horizontal effect was only applicable with regard 
to the rules of competition, whereas the rules on free movement only had vertical 
effect was abandoned.
110 In Walrave and Koch, for instance, the ECJ ruled that ‘the 
rule of non-discrimination applies in judging all legal relationships in so far as these 
relationships, by reason either of the place they are entered into or the place where 
they take effect, can be located within the territory of the Community’.
111
Furthermore, the ECJ found that the provisions on the free movement of workers had 
not only vertical, but also horizontal effect in Clean Car
112 and Angonese,
113 noting 
that application of Article 39 only to public authority acts would disregard the fact 
that working conditions are typically governed both by public law and rules adopted 
by private persons. Thus, these rulings extended the Defrenne case-law
114 into the 
area of free movement of workers.  
The attempt of the ECJ to adopt a coherent approach regarding the acceptance of the 
horizontal effect of the fundamental freedoms is more than obvious. In 
Schmidberger,
115 the Court had found that private action should be subject to the free 
movement of goods provisions. In this case, it applied horizontally the fundamental 
freedom by balancing the fundamental right to freedom of expression of a group of 
individuals who were demonstrating against the right of a transport company to 
exercise its rights deriving from the Treaty relating to the free movement of goods.
116
Even if the action in Schmidberger was brought against the State, the facts in the 
record suggest that the State was the third party in a situation where the 
constitutional rights of one private party were jeopardized by the actions of 
another.
117 In Viking Line,
118 the ECJ had to decide, inter alia, on the horizontal 
108 36/74, Walrave [1974] ECR 1405, paras 17, 23-24; 13/76, Donà [1976] ECR 1333, paras 17, 18; 
C-415/93, Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921, paras 83-84; C-176/96 Lehtonen [2000] ECR I-2681, para 35; 
C-309/99, Wouters, para. 120. 
109 C-519/04, Meca-Medina v Commission 2006 I-6991, para. 24. 
110 See, for instance, 41/74, Van Duyn 1974 ECR 1337, paras 4-8. 
111 36/74, Walrave [1974] ECR 1405, para. 28. 
112 C-350/96, Clean Car 1998 ECR I-2521, paras 19-21. 
113 C-281/98, Angonese 2000 ECR I-4139, paras 33-34, 36. 
114 43/75 Defrenne [1976] ECR 455, paras 31 and 39. 
115 C-112/00, Schmidberger 2003 ECR I-5659, paras 57 and 62. 
116 See also C-265/95, Commission v France [1997] ECR I-6959, para. 30. 
117 For an excellent analysis on this issue, see AG Maduro’s opinion in C-438/05, Viking Line (not yet - 21 - 
effect of Article 43 on the freedom of establishment, i.e. whether a private 
undertaking can confer rights from this provision on which it can rely against a trade 
union or an association of trade unions. As expected, the ECJ had no difficulty in 
confirming the application of its settled case-law relating to horizontal effect also in 
the case of Article 43 mutatis mutandis.
119 The ECJ suggested that the collective 
action taken by the trade unions and the association thereof is liable to restrict the 
exercise of the freedom of establishment by another private party and thus violates 
Article 43.
120 In previous cases, the ECJ applied the free movement provisions to 
private action notably when it aims to bear on working conditions and access to 
employment
121 or in the case of sport associations due to their powerful influence 
over the organization of professional sports.
122
In Viking Line, it is argued that the ECJ was willing to protect the economic freedom 
of the employer. As the AG Maduro noted, ‘the possibility for a company to relocate 
to a Member State where its operating costs will be lower is pivotal to the pursuit of 
effective intra-Community trade’.
123 A similar conclusion seems to be apposite also 
in Laval.
124 In this case, the ECJ accepted the horizontal direct effect of Article 49 by 
underscoring, based on the aforementioned case-law, that rules which are designed to 
regulate collectively the provision of services cannot escape the scope of the freedom 
to provide services by the simple fact that they are not public in nature.
125
Confirming its stance in Viking Line, the ECJ again appeared to balance the 
conflicting rights (fundamental freedom against fundamental rights to protect 
workers against social dumping) in favour of free movement. In this case, however, 
it was more eloquent than in Viking Line. Whilst in the latter, the ECJ suggested that 
it is for the national court to undertake the proportionality test, in Laval the ECJ, in 
light of the severity of the means chosen by the domestic trade union (i.e. a blockade 
of sites), decided to undertake the proportionality test itself to conclude that it was 
not met, based on the safety net already provided by the Directive 96/71 on posting 
of workers and on the obscurity or lack of provisions altogether specifying the 
obligations of employers with respect to minimum pay. However, it would be 
erroneous to consider that the ECJ adopted a human-rights- or labour-unfriendly 
stance. Arguably, the rulings of the ECJ are strictly fact-specific and should not be 
used to draw more general conclusions as to social protection within the Union. On 
the other side, it would be safe to say that the ECJ is not prepared to overrule light-
heartedly a restriction to the fundamental freedoms, notably when their application 
may ensure an optimal allocation of resources throughout the Union. 
It follows from the previous discussion that the ECJ is determined to outlaw any 
provision of any nature which can be capable to prevent or deter an EU citizen from 
leaving his home country to exercise her right to freedom of movement. Any signal 
of disadvantaging nationals of another MS in the territory of a given MS, which 
subsequently impedes or renders less attractive the use of the Treaty constitutional 
published). 
118 Ibid. 
119 Ibid, para. 61. 
120 Ibid, paras 72-73. 
121 C-281/98, Angonese; and C-438/00, Deutscher Handballbund 2003 ECR I-4135. 
122 For the relevant case-law, see supra note 108. 
123 AG Maduro’s Opinion in Viking Line, point 57; the ECJ confirmed this view in para. 72 of the 
judgment. 
124 C-341/05, Laval 2007 ECR I-11767. 
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rights, can be sufficient to trigger the application of the free movement provisions.
126
In Mobistar, for instance, the ECJ submitted that rules which have the effect of 
making the provision of services between MS more difficult than the provision of 
services purely within one MS are to be outlawed.
127 When exercise of fundamental 
rights is in conflict with the exercise of the freedom of movement, the Court will 
attempt to strike a balance based on the facts of the case and the interests at stake. 
Nonetheless, neither fundamental rights nor fundamental freedoms are absolute.
128
The Court is willing to take up this daunting task, absent any serious attempt by the 
State to resolve the matter in a satisfactory manner. The Court’s case-law hints at the 
need for a more pro-active and reflexive reaction from the State when such issues are 
raised to avoid recourse to judicial means. Indeed, MS may and should interfere with 
private rules by appropriate legislation or court decisions at any time. Given the risk 
of bias that may characterize private rules, such state intervention may become 
quintessential to restore the balance of rights and obligations or comply with the 
obligations enshrined in the Treaty. 
Interestingly, however, this may not be the end of the story for our purposes of 
examining the consistency with EC law of restrictions based on CoC. Even if non-
discriminatory, a restriction on free movement cannot be sustained unless it pursues 
an EU-consistent legitimate objective, is justified by overriding reasons of public 
interest and complies with the proportionality principle. In Gebhard,
129 and more 
recently in Wouters, the Court found or implied that national measures liable to 
hinder or make less attractive the exercise of the right to free movement can be 
justified, based, inter alia, on professional ethics considerations. Hence, the 
protection of professional ethics can be considered as a legitimate, overriding reason 
of public interest.
130 It follows that when examining the compliance of CoC rules 
with Community rules on fundamental freedoms, the rules of professional conduct 
and ethics will be examined as a justification of the violation of free movement rules. 
Therefore, what would seem to be of paramount importance under this constellation 
is to what extent the measure that allegedly substantiates or is based on a rule of 
ethics and conduct complies with the principle of proportionality, that is, it is suitable 
for the attainment of the objective pursued and does not go beyond what is necessary 
in order to attain it.
131 Again, governmental rules may override compliance with such 
ethical rules. For instance, in the case of an organized campaign to combat illegal 
activities such as money laundering, limitations to the principles of confidentiality 
and professional secrecy can be considered as proportionate and justified.
132
126 C-442/02 CaixaBank France [2004] ECR I-8961, paragraph 11. 
127 C-545/03, Mobistar 2005 ECR I-7723, para. 30. 
128 To corroborate this view, see Art. 52:1 of the Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union, 
which provides that: ‘any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by this 
Charter must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms. Subject to 
the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely 
meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and 
freedoms of others’. See also AG Maduro’s opinion in Viking Line, point 23. 
129 C-55/94, Gebhard 1995 ECR I-4165. 
130 See, by analogy, in regard to the reputation of a given services sector. C-384/93, Alpine 
Investments 1995 ECR I-1141, paras 42-44. 
131 See, inter alia, C-415/93, Bosman, para. 104. 
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F. The relevance of competition rules 
Unquestionably, rules of professional conduct come under the scope of EU 
competition law, as they organize and influence the exercise of a given profession.
133
The compatibility of rules contained in CoC with EU law may be contentious when 
examined through the lens of competition law. Such an examination is however 
necessary to ensure that equal competitive conditions are offered to the economic 
operators active in the EU market.
134
There are five principal categories of rules relating to professional services that may 
be in violation of EU competition rules. These relate to: price fixing; recommended 
prices and minimum fees;
135 restrictions relating to commercial communications; 
entry requirements and reserved rights; and regulations relating to legal form, 
ownership and multi-disciplinary practices.
136 In several instances, professional 
bodies have included these types of restrictions in their CoC and linked them to the 
proper conduct of the profession and the interests of the consumer.
137
Empirical studies suggest that the theoretical perception alleging that a causal link 
exists between heavy regulation and better quality for consumers does not hold.
138
Economic theory further demonstrates that self-regulation, i.e. granting to a 
professional body a monopoly right over the pursuit of a professional service and 
allowing it to exert a restricting influence over entry to the profession, would 
generate important economic rents in the form of excess revenues for the 
incumbents. Prices in this case will be higher without in fact any indication of quality 
improvement. For instance, in Cipolla, the Commission argued that no causal link 
has been established between the setting of minimum levels of fees and a high 
qualitative standard of legal services.
139 Therefore, it is worth examining the 
applicability of EU competition rules to the rules that a professional CoC may 
comprise. 
In Meca-Medina, the Court made it explicit that, even in the absence of economic 
activity, the non-application of the relevant fundamental freedoms does not exclude 
the application of Articles 81 and 82.
140 Rather, a separate analysis should be 
undertaken to examine whether (1) the rules governing the activity are created by an 
undertaking; (2) this undertaking restricts competition or abuses its dominant 
position; and (3) this restriction or abuse affects intra-community trade.  
The concept of undertaking under EC law is relative. Case-law gives a functional 
content to this concept by considering as undertaking ‘any entity engaged in an 
economic activity irrespective of its legal status and the way it is financed’.
141 Any 
activity, in turn, consisting in offering goods or services in a given market is deemed 
an economic activity.
142 Liberal professions, inter alia, come under this definition. 
133 T-144/99, Institut des mandataires agréés 2001 ECR II-1087, para. 64. 
134 C-49/07, MOTOE (not yet published), para. 51. 
135 See also recital 73 of the Services Directive. 
136 European Commission, ‘Report on Competition in Professional Services’, COM(2004)83, 9 
February 2004, p. 3. 
137 See, more recently, the Commission Decision of 24 June 2004 on the recommended prices for 
Belgian architects, case COMP/38.2549. 
138 OECD, ‘Competition in Professional Services’, supra note 76. 
139 Supra note 52. 
140 C-519/04, Meca-Medina v Commission, paras 30-31. 
141 C-41/90, Höfner and Elser [1991] ECR I-1979. 
142 C-49/07, MOTOE (not yet published), para. 22. - 24 - 
An entity can partially exercise public authority and thus not come under the purview 
of the competition rules, but still be subject to the competition rules if it additionally 
undertakes activities within a competitive market on which a number of undertakings 
act in competition.
143 However, entities whose activities are exclusively social or of 
public interest and are not pursued in competition with other economic agents in the 
relevant market are excluded from the scope of competition rules.
144 Case-law 
suggests that the concept of economic activity is to be interpreted broadly to include 
any activity which is capable of being carried on by a profit-making organization and 
under market conditions.
145 Non-profit entities are still to be considered as 
undertakings if they compete in the same market with entities which seek to make a 
profit.
146 The size of the entity or the extent of its economic success does not play a 
decisive role.
147
In Wouters, the Court ruled that lawyers are undertakings within the meaning of the 
EU competition law, as they offer, against remuneration, services and bear the 
financial risks that failures may entail.
148 By the same token, in CNSD
149 customs 
agents were considered as undertakings, whereas in Pavlov
150 medical specialist 
doctors also came under this term. This would obviously apply for the overwhelming 
majority of the service suppliers delivering professional services. Furthermore, à la 
Wouters, the professional body should be considered as an association of 
undertakings pursuant to Article 81 for it influences the conduct of its members on 
the market in the respective services sector and directs them to act in a particular 
manner when they carry their economic activity.
151 Nevertheless, the governing 
professional body does not come under Article 81 if it is composed of a majority of 
representatives of public authorities and is required to observe pre-defined public 
interest criteria.
152
In addition, an association of undertakings can be itself an undertaking in case it 
exercises any economic activity. Thus, rules created in the exercise of the body’s 
regulatory autonomy such as CoC constitute a decision adopted by an association of 
undertakings within the meaning of Article 81:1.
153 If such decisions affect trade 
between MS
154 and de facto or de jure prevent, restrict or distort intra-EU 
competition, they are void by virtue of Article 81:2. The so-called intra-community 
clause is, again, interpreted fairly broadly to cover any behaviour which may have an 
influence, direct or indirect, actual or potential, on intra-Community trade in a way 
143 For instance, the city of Trier was deemed an undertaking. See C-475/99, Ambulanz Glöckner 
[2001] ECR I-8089. 
144 C-222/04, Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze 2006 ECR I-289, paras 120-121. Again, the absence of 
profit motive will not be determinant if there is competition with other for-profit organizations. See C-
49/07, MOTOE, paras 27-28. 
145 C-264/01, AOK Bundesverband 2004 ECR I-2493, paras 50, 58.  
146 C-222/04, Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze, paras 122-3. 
147 Opinion of Advocate General Lenz in C-415/93, Bosman 1995 ECR I-4921, point 255. 
148 C-309/99, Wouters, para. 49.  
149 C-35/96, Commission v Italy (CNSD) 1998 ECR I-3851, para. 37. 
150 C-180/98, Pavlov 2000 ECR I-6451. 
151 C-309/99, Wouters, paras 63-4. 
152 C-35/99, Arduino 2002 ECR I-1529, para. 37-39. 
153 Ibid, para. 71. Also T-144/99, Institut des mandataires agréés, para. 62. 
154 This is an autonomous criterion that needs to be assessed separately. See Joined Cases 56/64 and 
58/64, Consten and Grundig [1966] ECR 429. See also the Commission’s Guidelines on the effect on 
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that can hinder the attainment of the single market.
155 The relevant market can be 
only the domestic market or even certain regions thereof.
156 As the Commission puts 
it, in this latter type of cases, ‘the nature of the alleged infringement, and in 
particular, its propensity to foreclose the national market, provides a good indication 
of the capacity of the agreement or practice to affect trade between Member 
States’.
157 Regarding the effect, it should be appreciable (de minimis rule)
158 and is to 
be established based on both quantitative and qualitative elements.
159 From particular 
importance, is the attempt to identify those practices which are capable of 
constituting a threat to freedom of trade among MS
160 in a manner which might harm 
the attainment of the objectives of the single market, notably by partitioning of 
markets on a national basis or hindering the economic interpenetration in contrast to 
the objectives of the Treaty. In CNSD, the Court clarified that agreements extending 
over the whole of the territory of a MS have, by their very nature, such an effect.
161
Of course, these provisions do not aim to penalize every single agreement or decision 
that restricts the freedom of action of the parties or of one of them. Rather, the courts 
should examine the objectives of the agreements or decisions and the overall context 
in which the agreements or decisions are concluded or produce their effects, as well 
as whether the consequences which restrict competition are in fact inherent in the 
pursuit of those objectives and are limited to what is necessary to ensure the proper 
conduct of the profession, as it is organized in the MS at stake.
162 In this analysis, 
then, the peculiarities of the domestic market and of the specific profession will have 
a central role.
163 In Wouters, the CoC found that outright prohibitions of 
multidisciplinary practices in the legal profession are inconsistent with Article 
81:1(b) because they are liable to limit production and technical development,
164 as 
they do not allow the exploitation of the one-stop-shop advantage, the supply of ‘full 
service’ and the possible diminution of costs. However, the ECJ submitted that the 
rules at issue were designed to ensure the proper conduct of the profession and the 
sound administration of justice and therefore were justified and proportionate, 
thereby striking a balance between the anti-competitive behaviour and the pursuit of 
non-economic legitimate objectives. By the same token, anti-doping rules, while 
prima facie restrictive of competition, were justified because they were designed to 
ensure fair rivalry among sport athletes and complied with the principle of 
proportionality. State compulsion can also function as a defence under Article 81; it 
cannot, however, be invoked when the national law merely allows, encourages or 
makes it easier for undertakings/associations to engage in autonomous anti-
155 C-295/04, Manfredi 2006 ECR I-6619, para. 42. 
156 C-475/99, Ambulanz Glöckner, para. 38. 
157 See Commission’s Guidelines, supra note 154, para. 77. 
158 Commission’s Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably restrict 
competition under Article 81(1) of the Treaty establishing the European Community (de minimis)
2001 OJ C 368/13. 
159 Joined cases, C-215/96 and C-216/96, Bagnasco and Others 1999 ECR I-135, paras 47, 60; C-
49/07, MOTOE, para. 39. 
160 Just as under the WTO case-law, ECJ case-law confirms that effects are essentially immaterial. See 
Case C-55/96, Job Centre 1997 ECR I-7119,  para. 36. 
161 C-35/96, Commission v Italy (CNSD), para. 48. 
162 C-519/04, Meca-Medina v Commission, paras 42, 47. 
163 Joined Cases C-94/04 and C-202/04, Cipolla, para. 68. See also European Commission, supra note 
136, p. 19. 
164 C-309/99, Wouters, para. 90. - 26 - 
competitive conduct.
165
It still remains to be examined whether, when adopting rules enshrined in CoC, the 
professional associations can act inconsistently with Article 86 relating to dominant 
position.
166 Settled ECJ case-law portrays this concept as ‘a position of economic 
strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to prevent effective competition 
being maintained on the relevant market by giving it the power to behave to an 
appreciable extent independently of its competitors, customers and ultimately of its 
consumers’.
167 Importantly, in MOTOE, the Court clarified that an undertaking can, 
inter alia, acquire a dominant position when it is granted special or exclusive rights 
enabling it to determine whether and under what conditions other undertakings can 
have access to the relevant market and supply their services.
168 It further found that 
Articles 82 and 86:1 are violated when granting such rights within the meaning of 
Article 86:1 is liable to create a risk of an abuse of a dominant position.
169
By analogy, then, a professional association, to which have been granted the power 
to self-regulate the conditions of a given professional activity as well as the power to 
decide on the well-founded of the applications for authorization to exercise a given 
professional activity, could be considered an undertaking to which a MS has granted 
special rights within the meaning of Article 86:1. However, this would presuppose 
that the professional association that previously has been considered as an 
association of undertakings is also an undertaking itself for the purposes of Article 
82. As noted earlier, economic activity is a precondition for the applicability of 
Article 82. A professional association, however, does not carry on an economic 
activity under Article 82.
170
Alternatively, Article 82 can apply if it can be proven that there is a collective 
dominant position where more undertakings which are legally independent of each 
other present themselves to act together on a particular market as a collective 
entity.
171 As all professionals can be regarded as undertakings within the meaning of 
EC competition rules, Article 82 could arguably apply in the case of a highly 
concentrated and homogeneous profession such as accountancy if it can be 
ascertained that economic links exist between the undertakings/professional service 
suppliers which enable them to act together independently of their competitors, their 
customers and consumers.
172 In Wouters, the Court rejected the applicability of 
Article 82 in the case of the legal profession arguing that lawyers ‘are not sufficiently 
linked to each other to adopt the same conduct on the market with the result that 
competition between them is eliminated’ and that the legal profession ‘is highly 
heterogeneous and is characterised by a high degree of internal competition’ without 
sufficient structural links between lawyers.
173 Again, even if collective dominant 
position is upheld, it needs to be demonstrated that abuse of such position has 
165 C-198/01 Consorzia Industrie Fiammiferi 2003] ECR I-8055, paras 52-56. 
166 Articles 81 and 82 can be applied simultaneously. See 322/81, Michelin 1983 ECR 3461, para. 
30.
167 27/76, United Brands v Commission 1978 ECR 207, para. 65. 
168 C-49/07, MOTOE, para. 38. 
169 Ibid, para. 50; also C-41/90, Höfner and Elser 1991 ECR I-1979, para. 29. 
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171 Joined cases, C-395/96 and 396/96, Compagnie Maritime Belge Transports SA 2000 ECR I-1365, 
para. 36. 
172 Ibid, para. 42 ; and T-193/02, Piau 2005 ECR II-209, para. 111. 
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occurred, as clarified in Piau.
174
G. Conclusion 
The implementation of the Services Directive should bring new dynamics in the 
creation of effective codes of conduct and the building of trust among the peoples of 
the Union. It is submitted that CoC have been used as a vehicle for introducing 
several requirements and conditions applied to professionals to foreclose the relevant 
market and increase the rents for the incumbents over the years. Although it was 
correctly pointed out that CoC create expectations to third parties, the unpalatable 
truth is that they cannot alone result in consistently improved professional 
behaviour.
175
Our analysis above demonstrated that the ECJ has adopted a lenient and fairly 
deferential approach when examining arguments of ethics, professional secrecy, 
integrity and reputation of the profession and other qualitative elements that CoC 
should aim to preserve and enhance. On the other hand, the proportionality test that 
the Court will apply in this case will be country- and sector-specific. The precise 
traits of the market and the nature of the profession and its inherent characteristics 
will be the focus in the proportionality test. More flexible solutions adopted in other 
countries will not automatically render disproportionate the solutions adopted in the 
MS in question.
Among several provisions of the directive that call for reform, Article 15 provides 
that self-regulating professional bodies need to evaluate several restrictions enshrined 
in domestic CoC which may relate to business structures and legal form, fixed 
pricing, or territorial restrictions, whereas other provisions discussed earlier 
underscore the importance of revising restrictions on commercial communications. 
According to the directive, some of these types of measures, including commercial 
communications, should form integral part of any attempt to draw up CoC at 
Community level for them to be meaningful. The task of creating such CoC appears 
to be daunting, and so will be their implementation once they are adopted at 
Community level. The directive specifies that MS will take accompanying measures 
encouraging professional associations to implement at national level the pan-
European CoC. As another piece of evidence of the bottom-up approach adopted, the 
role of national professional associations is quintessential in each and every stage of 
this process, from the decision over the content of the pan-European CoC to the 
surveillance of their implementation and the potential application of disciplinary 
sanctions. While the directive does not specify whether the CoC drawn up at 
Community level will be binding, the long-term preferred constellation is obvious 
from the structure of the directive: Initially voluntary CoC adopted at Community 
level which will be transposed at the national level (replacing the current national 
CoC, if needed) and become binding, thereby ensuring a minimum level of 
homogeneity and acceptable professional conduct across the Union with regard to 
issues such as ethics, professional secrecy, integrity, impartiality, business structure, 
or advertising. 
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